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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

Interim Report: Task Team VII - Analyst Communication

The attached task team interim report is distributed for discussion
and general approval of the initial lines of action suggested in para. 3,
page 5.

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Secretary

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15 October 1965

U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Documentation

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Task Team VII Report

1. Task Team VII submits the attached interim report for information and for CODIB's general approval of the initial lines of action suggested in paragraph 3.

2. As we have indicated, this first report should be considered strictly tentative. It is based on a partial investigation of one area only and represents only a portion of the sample that we expect to cover in that area. Nonetheless, we have collectively arrived at certain judgments which we feel can usefully be reported at this time, at least as a preview of a few basic considerations in the problem of analyst-to-analyst communication. If, as we proceed, we discover that our initial judgments are in error, we will so report to CODIB at once.

3. We believe that our efforts to date, while so far productive of relatively small result, will enable us to move in the future at a much accelerated pace.

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Chairman, CODIB Task Team VII

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COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII – ANALYST COMMUNICATION

INTERIM REPORT

1. As a result of its own deliberations and informal discussions with analysts of varying levels in State, CIA (DD/I) and DIA, the Task Team has reached certain interim conclusions concerning the problem of communication between analysts. These are based primarily on our partial investigation of the Latin American area, but we suspect that they are applicable in large part to other areas of the world as well.

a. There are, in fact, a surprisingly large number of mechanisms by which analysts from differing agencies collaborate and communicate. Among these mechanisms are: the USIB committees and subcommittees; the NIE mechanism; the coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB); various task teams set up from time to time; informal analyst discussion groups, e.g., Guatemala; and the operation of normal, established liaison arrangements. Through these various mechanisms, analysts identify their opposite numbers in other agencies, exchange information and opinions, and achieve working level cooperation. Nonetheless, there is variation in the application of these arrangements with respect to both geographic and functional

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coverage. For crisis coverage, analyst communication normally is good; in quiet areas, exchanges are minimal.

b. The time factor has a very real bearing on the question of analyst communication. This factor also is closely related to the problem of secure communication that is discussed in paragraph e. Thus, we find that consultation on current intelligence is very spotty--timeliness takes precedence over coordination. On the other hand, with some exceptions, more extensive consultation takes place on longer-range intelligence.

c. The problem of identifying the appropriate analysts in another agency is directly related to the organization structure of that agency or office. State, which has a straightforward geographic organization, presents little problem in comparison with CIA and DIA, which are organized on a mixed geographic and functional basis. The exchange of current organization charts would be helpful to each agency as a means of identifying the intelligence capabilities of other members of the community. Charts, however, should not be considered a tool for identifying analysts. (See paragraph (d) below) In order to avoid misuse and to overcome problems of security, organization charts of other agencies should be held only in the top offices of an agency and in established liaison circles.

d. The problem of identification has two facets. One is the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate level in the chain of command; the other is identification of the most knowledgeable or expert person on a particular subject, wherever he may

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be within an organization. The first kind of identification can usually be done, if necessary, through established liaison channels, albeit these channels are sometimes slow and cumbersome. The second kind of identification, however, is extremely difficult and depends on the variables of individual knowledge or acquaintance. Even within agencies themselves, no organized method for this kind of identification exists, except within DIA which has now established a roster of its personnel showing the area or subject specialties and background of each individual. Rosters, however, should be considered to be intra-agency tools, useful, for example, for the purpose of adjusting personnel assignments to meet crisis situations. For interagency purposes, however, requirements of command channels must be maintained. Thus, it is the <u>responsible</u> analyst who is the key in this type of communication cycle and <u>not</u> the analyst who might be identified as more <u>knowledgeable</u>. For these reasons the idea of a complete <u>interagency</u> directory of analysts' skills and expertise seems of dubious value--even if the many obstacles to its preparation and maintenance could be overcome. Our present thinking on this problem of identification tends in the direction of improved liaison arrangements and the development and maintenance of additional and more clearly established points of approved contact. By so doing, the needs of command channels and security compartmentation can be met.

       e. The problem of secure communication between agencies deserves increased attention. We propose to examine the distribution and use of the "gray" line with a view to determining if, and how, it can

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be made a more useful tool for analyst-to-analyst communication. Arrangements now under way for secure facsimile transmission between the NMCC and Operations Centers in State and CIA may alleviate this problem to some extent. In this general field particularly we feel we shall, as we proceed, need the assistance and expertise of a representative from the NSA.

f. Variations in individual security clearances as a hindrance to analyst-to-analyst communication does not appear to present a problem in Latin America. This may, however, not be true elsewhere where more exotic types of collection efforts are employed.

g. A factor inhibiting analyst-to-analyst communication is that of normal departmental and agency internal constraints with respect to departmentally-oriented intelligence. The cumulative affect of these constraints is sometimes to erect an invisible but very real barrier to communication and coordination among analysts in different agencies. Nevertheless, we believe that these constraints are a normal and a necessary adjunct to command and policy responsibility, and that no action to eliminate this inhibitory factor is warranted.

2. It has often been assumed that existing arrangements for analyst-to-analyst communication and collaboration were seriously deficient. For the purpose of confirming this assumption, and pin-pointing more precisely the specific areas of deficiency, the Task Team has developed a questionnaire which it is discussing with selected analysts in State, DIA and CIA concerned with Latin America. DIA has completed

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these discussions and State and CIA expect to do so shortly. The Task Team will then be in a position to direct its attention to specific areas for improvement, if such should emerge.

3. Based upon its limited survey to date of the problem, the Task Team believes the following recommendations are pertinent to the Latin American area and intends to develop them further in connection with its future study.

a. Each agency should develop a directory of its available intelligence skills and expertise for its own internal use, especially for strengthening staffs in crisis situations.

b. Interagency liaison arrangements and additional points of contact should be reviewed and strengthened. These arrangements should include a comprehensive exchange of organization charts of the production components of the agencies.

c. Present facilities by which analysts in one agency communicate with their opposites either orally or by facsimile or similar methods, are susceptible to considerable improvement.

d. The establishment of analyst-to-analyst relationships should be included as part of the ongoing crisis contingency planning between State, Defense and CIA.

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